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Looking at our face in a mirror is one of the strongest phenomenological experiences
of the Self in which we need to identify the face as reflected in the mirror as
belonging to us. Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies reported that self-face
identification not only relies upon visual-mnemonic representation of one’s own face
but also upon continuous updating and integration of visuo-tactile signals. Therefore,
bodily self-consciousness plays a major role in self-face identification, with respect to
interplay between unisensory and multisensory processing. However, if previous studies
demonstrated that the integration of multisensory body-related signals contributes to
the visual processing of one’s own face, there is so far no data regarding how self-
face identification, inversely, contributes to bodily self-consciousness. In the present
study, we tested whether self–other face identification impacts either the egocentered
or heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms that are core processes of bodily self-
consciousness and sustain self–other distinction. For that, we developed a new
paradigm, named “Double Mirror.” This paradigm, consisting of a semi-transparent
double mirror and computer-controlled Light Emitting Diodes, elicits self–other face
merging illusory effect in ecologically more valid conditions, i.e., when participants are
physically facing each other and interacting. Self-face identification was manipulated
by exposing pairs of participants to an Interpersonal Visual Stimulation in which the
reflection of their faces merged in the mirror. Participants simultaneously performed
visuo-spatial and mental own-body transformation tasks centered on their own face
(egocentered) or the face of their partner (heterocentered) in the pre- and post-
stimulation phase. We show that self–other face identification altered the egocentered
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visuo-spatial mechanisms. Heterocentered coding was preserved. Our data suggest
that changes in self-face identification induced a bottom-up conflict between the current
visual representation and the stored mnemonic representation of one’s own face which,
in turn, top-down impacted bodily self-consciousness.
Keywords: self-face identification, bodily self-consciousness, visuo-spatial mechanisms, self–other distinction
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between self and others is fundamental for
social interactions. In fact, under non-pathological conditions, a
balanced relationship between two individuals equally preserves
the processing of the Self and that of the Other. The Self is a
wide concept that includes, non-exhaustively, multidimensional
episodic, semantic but also physical personal representations and
associated perceptual-cognitive processes (Duval et al., 2007).
In this study, we focused on the physical Self and, especially,
on two of its fundamental phenomenological features. That is,
self-face identification and bodily self-consciousness. Self-face
identification refers to one’s ability to identify with the image of
one’s own face as reflected in the mirror (Rochat, 2003). Bodily
self-consciousness refers to one’s normal experience of the spatial
unity between the Self and the body (Blanke, 2012).
Self–other distinction already operates on a lower-order visual
level in self-face identification. This is reflected in the so-called
self-face prioritization (SFP) effect in which recognizing one’s
own face, compared to unfamiliar (Tong and Nakayama, 1999)
and familiar faces (Sugiura et al., 2005, 2006, 2008; Ma and
Han, 2010; Sui et al., 2015), always triggers faster response speed
and better performances. Self–other distinction also operates
on the visuo-spatial level in bodily self-consciousness. That is,
visuo-spatial mechanisms, respectively, centered on one’s own-
body (egocentered) and the other’s body (heterocentered) (Degos
et al., 1997; Cleret de Langavant et al., 2011) enable dissociating
between self and others in space (Thirioux et al., 2010). These
visuo-spatial processes are involved in perspective-change and
lie at the basis of higher-order self–other distinction such as in
empathy (Ruby and Decety, 2001, 2003; Frith and Frith, 2003;
Decety and Jackson, 2004; Thirioux et al., 2014a).
Until only recently, the modular approach has prevailed
in experimental research on physical self. It was assumed
that self-face identification and bodily self-consciousness are
sustained by different perceptual-cognitive mechanisms. That
is, self-face identification would be based upon unisensory and
mnemonic processing whereas bodily self-consciousness upon
multisensory processing and continual updating of body-related
information. However, behavioral and neuroimaging studies have
newly reported that self-face identification continually updates
body-related information and, specifically, integrates visual and
tactile signals (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2009; Paladino
et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Apps et al., 2015).
However, although visuo-spatial mechanisms are a core process
of bodily self-consciousness and require the integration of visual,
proprioceptive and vestibular signals, there is so far no data
regarding the relation between self-face identification and visuo-
spatial processing.
Multisensory Integration and
Visuo-spatial Mechanisms in Bodily
Self-consciousness
Self-identification with the body (the experience of owning a
body), self-location (the experience of where I am in space) and
first-person perspective (the experience from which I perceive the
world) are three main components of bodily self-consciousness
(Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Self-identification integrates
somatosensory and visual signals whilst self-location and first-
person perspective additionally integrates vestibular information
(Blanke, 2012). The integration of retinal, proprioceptive,
auditory and vestibular inputs in association with motor outputs
and body movements generate information related to the body
position in space and an egocentered referencing system (Berthoz
et al., 1975; Berthoz, 1988, 1997; Ventre-Dominey et al., 2003;
Giummarra et al., 2008). Concordant with the phenomenological
features of bodily self-consciousness, specific activations at the
right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) in the vestibular system
(Kahane et al., 2003) have been reported to support self-location
and first-person perspective (Blanke et al., 2004; Ionta et al.,
2011).
The continual updating and integration of body-related
signals further enable encoding the other’s body position in space
and distinguishing between self and others. In fact, experiencing
the visuo-spatial perspective of another individual requires
imagining one’s own-body into the other’s body position (Vogeley
and Fink, 2003). This heterocentered coding necessitates
geometrical transformations including translations and rotations
of one’s viewpoint (Deroualle and Lopez, 2014). It also requires
multisensory integration based on mental simulation. It means
that encoding the visuo-spatial perspective of someone else relies
upon the mental simulation of visual, proprioceptive (sensory
perception of the position of one’s body parts) and vestibular
(self-motion) self-related processes (Deroualle and Lopez, 2014).
It has been recently shown that self–other distinction involves
parallel egocentered and heterocentered visuo-spatial coding,
respectively, in the right and left TPJ (Thirioux et al., 2010,
2014a; see also Berthoz, 2004). This co-processing would operate
in association with computational mechanisms that decouple
between first- and second-person signals in the right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC; Thirioux et al., 2014a; see also Aichhorn
et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; McCleery et al., 2011).
Interestingly, data from neurological patients with lesions at
the TPJ who experienced out-of-body experience (Irwin, 1985;
Devinsky et al., 1989; Brugger et al., 1997; Blanke et al., 2004)
or heautoscopy (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Hécaen and
Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Brugger, 2002), i.e., pathological embodiment
and self-location, evidenced how the multisensory integration
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of body-related information fundamentally contribute to
body ownership, self-location and first-person perspective. In
healthy subjects, behavioral studies report that multisensory
conflict between visual, proprioceptive, vestibular, and tactile
information alters bodily self-consciousness and disturbs self–
other distinction (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Ionta
et al., 2011). Stroking the back of participants synchronously with
the back of a virtual body presented through a head-mounted
display elicited self-identification with the virtual body (Ehrsson,
2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Olivé and Berthoz, 2012)
and modifications in self-location. That is, participants had
the impression to be located at a position in space that was
outside their physical position and toward that of the virtual
body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Aspell et al., 2009). Moreover,
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, when a virtual body was
seen from a visuo-spatial perspective matching the participants’
egocentered perspective, generated stronger self-identification
with the virtual body, in comparison to the second-person
perspective (heterocentered; Slater et al., 2010; Petkova et al.,
2011).
Taken together, these data firstly indicate that the integration
of visual, somatosensory, proprioceptive, and vestibular signals
is necessary to encode one’s own-body position in space
and egocentered visuo-spatial perspective. Secondly, these data
point out that this multisensory integration is also necessary
to mentally simulate the visuo-spatial perspective of another
individual and distinguish between self and others.
Multisensory Integration of Bodily
Related Signals in Self-face Identification
Behavioral research has until now mostly focused on the
contribution of visual processing and mnemonic representations
of one’s own face to self-face identification (Tong and Nakayama,
1999; Brédart, 2003; Brady et al., 2004, 2005). In addition
to higher-order semantic processes enabling to access an
amodal representation of the self, these mechanisms validate the
knowledge that the individual as seen in the mirror is the self
(Morin, 2007; Devue and Brédart, 2011; Sugiura et al., 2012,
2014). However, self-face identification has been recently shown
to also integrate visual and tactile information, similarly to bodily
self-consciousness (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2009; Paladino
et al., 2010; Apps et al., 2015). This has been demonstrated
by causing illusory self-identification with the face of another
individual while using interpersonal multisensory stimulation
(IMS) in healthy volunteers (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012).
Especially, synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation between one’s
own face and a morphed face consisting of 50% of the
participant’s face and 50% of the face of someone else was
found to alter self-face recognition judgments. That is, after IMS,
participants assessed images of morphed faces with more other-
than self-face physical features as containing higher percentage of
self- than other-face features (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2009).
Therefore, participants incorporated the features of the other’s
face into the representation of their own face (Maister et al.,
2013). This “enfacement experience” – i.e., the experience to see
and feel the other’s face as one own face (Tsakiris, 2008) – shows
that IMS, affecting multisensory integration processing, alters
self–other distinction.
Data from low frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS) studies corroborated the role of body-related
signals integration in self-face identification. Stimulation over the
right but not left TPJ has been reported to impair visual self–
other discrimination (Uddin et al., 2006). In this case, morphed
images with 60% of other-face physical features were evaluated
as containing more “self ” than “other.” Heinisch et al. (2011),
using a video-based morphing technique, further specified
that rTMS over the right TPJ biases self–other distinction
toward less conservative self-recognition performance. Other-
face recognition was preserved.
In line with these results, the perception of current but not past
images of one’s own face has been found to activate the inferior
occipital gyrus (IOG) in association with the inferior temporal
gyrus (ITG) and TPJ. These co-activations indicate that the visual
representation of one’s facial appearance is continuously updated
(Apps et al., 2012). Therefore, multisensory integration in facial
self-consciousness would underpin both self-identification and
self-updating (Apps et al., 2012). Moreover, in an fMRI study
employing IMS and visual self–other discrimination tasks, the
intensity of the enfacement experience was associated with an
IOG activation that positively co-varied with a decrease of the
BOLD signal in the TPJ (Apps et al., 2015). It means that the
modulation of the self–other distinction in the TPJ affected
the visual representation of one’s own face in the IOG and,
consequently, self-identification.
Collectively, these data demonstrate that the interplay between
unisensory and multisensory processing and updating lies at the
basis of both self-face identification and distinction between one’s
own and other’s face (Apps et al., 2015).
Limitations and Hypotheses
Overall, these studies provide important insights into how self-
face identification relates to multisensory integration of body-
related signals. However, these data need to be further expanded
for four main reasons.
Firstly, if egocentered and heterocentered visuo-spatial
mechanisms continuously update bodily self-consciousness,
there is so far no data regarding how self-face identification
relates to the integration of visual, proprioceptive, and vestibular
signals. In fact, previous studies have mainly focused on the
relation between self-face identification and integration of visuo-
tactile information.
Secondly, prior studies investigating the interplay between
unisensory and multisensory processing in self-face identification
used experimental paradigms that are based upon induced
multisensory conflicts. Especially, these studies addressed
the question whether visuo-tactile conflicts affect the visual
representations of one’s own face (multisensory→ unisensory).
However, if the hypothesis that there is an interplay – i.e.,
a bidirectional interaction – between multisensory and
unisensory processing in self-face identification is suitable,
then experimental paradigms should also test whether an
induced unisensory conflict affects the multisensory processing
(unisensory → multisensory). To the best of our knowledge,
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there is until now no data regarding how self-identification with
the other’s face in a mirror (i.e., induced visual conflict) impacts
the visuo-spatial referencing systems.
Thirdly, if a dynamic switch between the egocentered
and heterocentered perspective preserves self–other distinction
on a visuo-spatial level, it is still unknown whether self-
identification with the other’s face impacts either the egocentered
or heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms.
Fourthly, previous studies most often investigated the relation
between self-face identification and multisensory integration
when an individual was presented with pre-recorded images or
videos of his/her own face that was morphed with the face of
someone else. That is, these studies did not use real-time self–
other face morphing or merging illusion when two individuals are
facing each other and interacting. Although of high technology
quality, these setups render therefore the experimental conditions
less ecologically valid.
Here, we aimed to investigate whether identifying oneself
with the face of another individual impacts (i.e., in terms
of impairment and/or improvement) the egocentered or
heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms that sustain self–other
distinction. For that, we developed a new paradigm, named
“Double Mirror,” that enables testing self-consciousness by
exposing two individuals to Interpersonal Visual Stimulation
(IVS) in ecologically more valid conditions, i.e., when individuals
are physically facing each other and interacting. We used an
innovative technology that is based upon a semi-transparent
double mirror and a set of five computer-controlled Light
Emitting Diodes (LEDs) that is fixed in the middle of the upper
edge of each mirror’s side. If two individuals, A and B, are
facing either side of the mirror and only the LED set on A’s
side is on, A can see his/her own face reflected in the mirror
but without seeing B’s face through the mirror (Self-condition).
Simultaneously, B can see A’s face through the mirror but without
seeing his/her own face reflected in the mirror (Other-condition;
and vice-versa if only the LED set on B’s side is on). If the
two LED set are alternatively flickering at a frequency of about
8 Hz, the reflections of the two individuals’ faces are merging
into the mirror, inducing self-identification with the other’s face
and the striking phenomenological experience of making one
with the other (Figure 1).
The present experiment consisted of three phases: pre-
stimulation test (phase 1), IVS (phase 2) and post-stimulation test
(phase 3). We tested pairs of healthy volunteers who were facing
each other and interacting. The two participants simultaneously
performed visuo-spatial and mental own-body transformation
tasks either on themselves (Self-condition) or their facing
partner (Other-condition) before and after exposure to IVS.
Tasks were performed with respect to green flashes that were
emitted by markers placed symmetrically on the participants’
left and right temples and that appeared randomly. In the Self-
condition, participants were instructed to assess whether the
green flash on their face as reflected in the mirror was physically
appearing on the left or right side of their own face (egocentered
visuo-spatial mechanisms). In the Other-condition, participants
assessed whether the green flash was physically appearing on the
left or right side of their partner’s face seen through the mirror
FIGURE 1 | The Double Mirror system. (A), Two individuals, A and B, are
facing either side of the semi-transparent double mirror. A set of five white
LEDs is fixed in the middle of the upper edge of each mirror’s side. (B) If the
LEDs set on A’s side is on whereas that on B’s side is off, A can see his/her
own face reflected in the mirror without seeing B’s face through the mirror.
(C) In contrast, while using the same lighting mode, B can see A’s face
through the mirror without seeing his/her own face reflected in the mirror (and
vice-versa if the LEDs set on A’s and B’s side are, respectively, off and on).
(D) If both LEDs sets are simultaneously on and alternatively flickering at a
frequency of 8 Hz, the reflections of A’s and B’s faces are merging in the
mirror.
(heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms). In the IVS-phase,
participants judged whether the green flash on the self–other
morphed face as reflected in the mirror was physically appearing
on the left or right side of their own face or the face of their
partner.
There were four possible patterns of errors regarding self-
vs. other-face features attribution in the IVS-phase. That is,
participants could either over-attribute the features of their
own face to the face of their partner (Self → Other) or over-
attribute the features of their partner’s face to their own face
(Other→ Self). These further distinguish into over-attribution
in reflection symmetry (Thirioux et al., 2009; i.e., in mirror
reversal; Brugger, 2002) and rotation symmetry (Thirioux et al.,
2009; i.e., with preservation of the lateral asymmetry; Brugger,
2002). We aimed to analyze the different errors patterns in
the IVS-phase because (1) we hypothesized that a dominant
pattern of attribution error in reflection symmetry indicates
that the self–other face merging illusion is effective. That is,
this pattern would reflect that individuals identified themselves
with the reflection of the other’s face. In fact, this illusory felt
correspondence between the kinesthesic representation of one’s
own face and the reflection of the other’s face in the mirror
would resemble the normal matching between the kinesthesic
and physical representation of one’s own-face and the image of
one’s own face in a mirror. (2) We further hypothesized that these
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different patterns of attribution errors would have a different
impact on the egocentered and heterocentered mechanisms in the
post-stimulation test. We expected that a prevailing attribution
pattern in reflection symmetry for Self-trials (Self → Other)
and Other-trials (Other→ Self) would, respectively, impair and
improve the egocentered coding in the post-stimulation test, in
comparison to the pre-stimulation test. In contrast, we expected
that a prevailing attribution pattern in rotation symmetry for Self-
trials (Self → Other) and Other-trials (Other → Self) would,
respectively, improve and impair the heterocentered coding in
the post-stimulation test.
Our data show that self–other face identification impaired
the egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms. In contrast,
heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms were preserved. This
suggests that changes in self-face identification induced a bottom-
up mismatching between the current visual representation of
one’s own face and the stored mnemonic representation
of the self-face which, in turn, top-down impacted bodily
self-consciousness.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Nine pairs of healthy volunteers took part in this experiment.
In order to generate a more robust self–other face merging
illusory effect, we tested same-sexed pairs of participants. We
excluded the data from four participants because of bad recording
conditions during the IVS-phase (for more details, see Post-
stimulation Test). For the final analysis, we included, thus, the
data from the remaining fourteen participants (six women, eight
men; aged 19–32 years; mean ± SD 22.1 ± 3). All participants
were right-handed according to the Edinburgh handedness
inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All participants had normal vision,
i.e., without correction. Thus, individuals with eyeglasses for
vision correction or contact lens were systematically excluded
from participation. None reported history of neurological or
psychiatric disorders.
Ethics Statement
All volunteers were naïve to the purpose of the experiment,
gave written informed consent and were given with monetary
compensation of 10 € after the experiment. The study protocol
has been approved by the local ethics research committee and
performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in
the Declaration of Helsinki.
Experimental Setup
Stimulus and Apparatus
The “Double Mirror” paradigm
We used the Alter Ego System that was designed and
programmed by Moritz Wehrmann©. We here introduce
the term “Double Mirror” to refer to the Alter Ego
System. This consists of a semi-transparent double mirror
(70 cm× 50 cm× 0.4 cm; height× width× depth) and two sets
with five white LEDs each. A LED set is fixed in the middle of
the upper edge of each mirror’s side (Figure 1). These LED sets
can [1] emit continuous light either separately (i.e., only one of
the two sets is on) or simultaneously (i.e., both sets are on) or [2]
flicker alternatively at a given frequency.
These different using modes of lighting enable generating,
when two individuals – A and B – are facing either side
of the mirror, different Self-face and Other-face perceptual
conditions (Figure 1A). These lighting modes determined our
three experimental conditions and associated tasks (see Tasks).
[1] If the LED set on A’s side is on (A’s face is illuminated) whereas
that on B’s side is off (B’s face is not illuminated), A can see
his/her own face reflected in the mirror (as in a usual mirror)
but without seeing B’s face through the mirror. We here refer
to this perceptual condition as Self-condition (Figure 1B). [2]
Using this same lighting mode, B can see A’s face through the
mirror (as through a window) but without seeing his/her own
face reflected in the mirror. We refer to this perceptual condition
as Other-condition (Figure 1C). And vice-versa, if the sets on A’s
and B’s sides are, respectively, off and on.
[3] If the two LED sets are simultaneously on (both A’s and
B’s faces are illuminated), the reflections of A’s and B’s faces are
merging in the mirror. In this case, A can see his/her own face
being merged with B’s face, and reciprocally for B (Figure 1D).
This illusory effect of self-identification with the other’s face is
further reinforced if the LED sets are alternatively flickering. We
refer to this condition as IVS-condition.
Both sampling switch between the two LED sets and the
flicker frequencies range (1–20 Hz) were controlled by a PC using
E-Prime software (Psychological Software; Figure 2A).
Handling procedures
The experiment took place in an entirely darkened enclosed
area that was set up inside the testing room. The mirror was
fixed transversally in the middle of a black plywood table
(130 cm × 80 cm). Furthermore, the mirror was built in
black curtain parts that extended vertically until the ceiling and
laterally until the adjacent walls, splitting the enclosed areas
into two smaller areas (Figure 2A). Each participant was seated
on a stool at each end of the table in one dedicated area and
facing his/her partner (distance between the participants’ faces:
130 cm; Figures 1A and 2A). Participants faced one side of the
mirror and a serial response box with four response buttons
(Figure 2B). Each response box was fixed on the table behind
a black wood cover so that participants were not able to see
through the mirror the fingers’ movements of their facing partner
and which response button was pressed (Figures 1A and 2A).
To prevent Self- and Other-recognition biases, participants wore
black long sleeve shirts and had removed all personal belonging
(such as jewelry, scarf, watch, etc.). Participants with long hair
were instructed to tie back their hair with an elastic band. We
manually adjusted the stool’s height of each participant so that
the reflections of the participants’ eyes were at the same level
and merged in the mirror. This was done while the two LED
sets were simultaneously on (without flickering). Using hypo-
allergenic and transparent Band-AidTM, we placed two markers
light, emitting green light, symmetrically on the participants’
left and right temples (Figure 2C). These marker lights were
controlled with a PC using E-Prime software. Because we used
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental setup and procedures. (A) We set up an entirely darkened enclosed area inside the testing room. The mirror was fixed transversally in
the middle of a table and built in black curtain parts, splitting the enclosed area into two smaller areas. Each participant was seated on a stool at each end of the
table in one dedicated area and facing his/her partner. (B) Participants used a serial response box with four mute response buttons that was placed in front of them
and behind a black wood cover. (C) We placed two markers light, emitting green light, symmetrically on the participants’ left and right temples. Participants
performed visuo-spatial transformation tasks with respect to green flashes that were emitted by the markers. Participants further wore B-Brand polyurethane ear
plugs that prevented them from synchronizing their response with that of their partner.
a semi-transparent double mirror, the brightness of the markers
when reflected in the mirror in the Self-condition and when seen
through the mirror in the Other-condition was equalized. This
prevented from self- vs. other- recognition biases in the IVS-
condition (see Phase 2: Interpersonal visual stimulation). Then,
we made sure that participants could not see in the peripheral
vision the green flash emitted by the markers on their temples.
For that, participants were instructed to stare at a red point
embedded into the mirror (viewing distance: 65 cm) while the
markers on their left and right temples were emitting green
flashes randomly (duration: 500 ms; mean ISI: 2500 ms; 10
trials (5 [repetitions] × 2 [markers])). Participants were asked
to verbally indicate whether and when they have seen in the
peripheral vision a green flash emitted by the left or right
marker. Markers were considered as being correctly positioned
if participants reported to have not seen a green flash during any
trial.
Based on previous work (Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al.,
2006; Mohr et al., 2006; Thakkar et al., 2009; Thirioux et al.,
2009, 2010, 2014b), we expected faster reaction times (RTs)
when participants performed the visuo-spatial task on themselves
than on their facing partner. Consequently, to avoid a response
synchronization bias due to that participants performed the tasks
simultaneously (see Tasks), we used mute response buttons and
participants wore B-Brand polyurethane ear plugs (Figure 2C).
This prevented participants from hearing when the response
button was pressed by their facing partner and, thus, from
synchronizing their responses. Then, we further checked that
the clicking sound was not audible. For that, we instructed
participants to keep their eyes closed and to verbally indicate if
they have heard a clicking sound while their partner was pressing
one of the four response buttons on the response box. They were
five repetitions per response button (5 × 4 trials). The button-
press was considered as not being audible if participants reported
to have heard no sound during any trial.
Tasks
To test whether self–other face identification impacts either
the egocentered or heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms,
we induced changes in self-identification in an IVS phase in
which the reflection of the two participants’ faces were merged
in the semi-transparent double mirror. Participants performed
egocentered and heterocentered visuo-spatial tasks in the pre-
stimulation test and repeated these tasks in the post-stimulation
test, i.e., after exposure to IVS.
Phase 1: Pre-stimulation test
In the pre-stimulation test, one participant was tested in the Self-
condition whilst the second participant was simultaneously tested
in the Other-condition (see The “Double Mirror” paradigm).
In the Self-condition, participants performed a self-centered
task that combined egocentered visuo-spatial manipulation
and mental own-body transformation with embodied self-
location (Arzy et al., 2006; Self-task). In the Other-condition
(see The “Double Mirror” paradigm), participants performed
an other-centered task that combined heterocentered visuo-
spatial manipulation and mental own-body transformation with
disembodied self-location (Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006)
[Other-task], and vice-versa depending on blocks.
Only the two green markers lights on the face of the
participant tested in the Self-condition were on and emitted
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light randomly whereas those on the participant tested in the
Other-condition were off.
Self-task (Self-condition) – In the Self-task, we asked
participants to assess whether the green flash that was emitted
by the markers on their temples was appearing on the left or
right side of their face as reflected in the mirror. The exact
instruction was: “You will see your face reflected in the mirror.
The markers on your right and left temples will emit green light
randomly. Your task consists in assessing whether the green flash
is appearing on the right or left side of your face.” Participants
were instructed to perform the task while imagining their body
at its actual physical position (i.e., using embodied self-location)
and keeping their own (egocentered) visuo-spatial perspective, as
they are used to when looking at themselves in the mirror.
Other-task (Other-condition) – In the Other-task,
participants were asked to judge whether the green flash
that was emitted by the markers on the temples of their facing
partner was appearing on the left or right side of his/her face.
The exact instruction was: “You will see the face of your facing
partner through the mirror. The markers on his/her right and
left temples will emit green light randomly. Your task consists
in judging whether the green flash is appearing on the right
or left side of your partner’s face.” We instructed participants
to perform the tasks while imagining their own body in the
body position of their facing partner (i.e., using disembodied
self-location) and adopting his/her visuo-spatial perspective
(heterocentered).
Green flashes appeared either on the right or left temple for
500 ms. A trial contained one flash and was initiated after a
variable interstimulus interval (ISI), randomly chosen between
2000 and 3000 ms (mean 2500 ms). Participants gave their
response with a button press on the response box and using
their right index finger (Figure 2B). Participants could give their
response from the stimulus onset and until 1500 ms after the
stimulus offset (i.e., 500 ms [stimulus duration] + 1500 ms).
Beyond this time limit, a “no-response” was recorded. There were
four blocks. Each participant performed the Self- and Other-tasks
in two blocks, respectively, and blocks were counterbalanced.
Within a block, in a random order, each stimulus (right or left
flash) appeared 20 times, giving rise to 40 trials and to a total
amount of 160 trials. Each participant performed 80 trials in the
Self- and Other-task, respectively.
Phase 2: Interpersonal visual stimulation
After completing the baseline visuo-spatial tasks, participants
were exposed to the IVS. Before the recording started, we
determined for each pair of participants at which frequency the
self–other face merging illusory effect was mutually considered
as maximal by both participants. This was done while both LEDS
sets were alternatively flickering and by modulating the flicker
frequencies in a range from 1 to 20 Hz. On average, participants
reported that this effect was maximal at 8 ± 1.1 Hz (mean ± SD;
6.4–9.8 Hz; Table 1).
In order that the experimental conditions remain as
ecologically valid as possible, the head of the participants was
not fixed. Moreover, because of anatomical differences between
participants, the position of the two faces was only adjusted
TABLE 1 | Flicker Frequencies: Interpersonal Visual Stimulation phase.
Pairs of participants Self–Other merging illusory effect (Hz)
P1-P2 8.6
P3-P4 8
P5-P6 7
P7-P8 9.6
P9-P10 7.8
P11-P12 9.8
P13-P14 7.6
P15-P16 6.4
P17-P18 7.6
Mean 8.04
SE 1.1
Table 1 indicates, for each pair of participants, the flicker frequency that was
mutually assessed by both participants as generating the most robust self–other
face merging illusory effect. The flicker frequency was determined in the handling
procedures before the recording of the Interpersonal Visual Stimulation phase
started. We here also report the frequency data for the four participants who were
finally excluded from the final data analysis.
with respect to the vertical but not horizontal axis. Before
the recording session started, participants were, thus, again
instructed to position their face so that the reflection of their eyes
matches with that of their partner in the mirror and to maintain
this position. Furthermore, they were explicitly instructed not to
move, i.e., not to perform lateral movements of their trunk or face
but also not to perform contractions of their facial muscles.
In the IVS phase, green flashes appeared randomly either on
the face of one or the other participant and either on the left
or right temple. We instructed participants to judge whether the
green flash on the self–other morphed face as reflected in the
mirror was physically appearing on the left or right side of their
own face or their partner’s face. The exact instruction was: “You
will see your face and that of your partner being merged in the
mirror. The markers on your right and left temples and those
on your partner’s temples will emit green light randomly, i.e., [1]
either on your left or right temple or [2] on the left or right temple
of your partner. Your task consists in assessing whether the green
flash is appearing on the left or right side of your own face or your
partner’s face.”
Participants gave their response with a button press on the
serial box. As in the pre-stimulation test, green flashes appeared
randomly for 500 ms (ISI: 2000–3000 ms; mean 2500 ms) and
participants could give their response from the stimulus onset
and until 1500 ms after the stimulus offset. There were four
blocks. Within a block, in a random order, each stimulus (right
or left flash) appeared 10 times on each participant’s face, giving
rise to 40 trials per block and a total amount of 160 trials. In the
aggregate, there were 80 Self-trials (i.e., trials in which the green
flash physically appeared on one’s own face) and 80 Other-trials
(i.e., trials in which the green flash physically appeared on the
partner’s face), respectively.
Phase 3: Post-stimulation test
Participants in the post-stimulation test performed the same
visuo-spatial and mental own-body transformation tasks in the
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same Self- and Other-conditions as they performed in the pre-
stimulation test, i.e., before exposure to IVS (see Phase 1: Pre-
stimulation test).
After the recording session, participants were debriefed in
order to collect their impression during the IVS-phase. Especially,
participants were asked whether they experienced the striking
feeling of making one with their facing partner.
Data Acquisition and Analysis
For each trial in each experimental phase, E-Prime recorded the
performance (left/right judgments as indicated by button presses)
and reaction times (RTs).
Pre-stimulation Test
In this test, we computed for each participant in each Self-
and Other-task the total amount and corresponding percentage
of correct responses and associated RTs. Because data on
performance and RTs were not normally distributed, we
calculated Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to test for statistical
difference between the Self- and Other-tasks on these two
parameters. Concerning performance, statistical measures were
done on the number of correct responses.
Interpersonal Visual Stimulation
In this phase, we calculated the number and corresponding
percentage of errors and absence of response (“no-response”;
see Phase 1: Pre-stimulation test and Phase 2: Interpersonal
visual stimulation). This was done for the Self- and Other-trials,
separately, and then for all the trials pooled together.
We hypothesized that a dominant pattern of attribution errors
in reflection symmetry indicates that the self–other face merging
illusion is effective. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the
egocentered vs. heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms in the
post-stimulation test would be differently impacted (i.e., impaired
vs. improved), depending on the prevailing pattern of attribution
errors during exposure to IVS (i.e., attribution errors in reflection
symmetry for Self- vs. Other-trials; attribution errors in rotation
symmetry for Self- vs. Other-trials). With this aim, the number
of errors and corresponding percentage were calculated for each
error pattern (see below). We further computed the associated
mean RTs for correct responses and each error pattern.
Error patterns
There were six potential error patterns in the IVS phase.
Attribution errors consisted for participants in either over-
attributing the facial features of their own face to their partner’s
face (Self → Other) or over-attributing the features of their
partner’s face to their own face (Other→ Self). That is, for Self-
trials, it consisted in assessing that the green flash appeared on
the partner’s face whereas it physically appeared on one’s own
face. For Other-trials, it consisted in assessing that the green flash
appeared on one’s own face whereas it physically appeared on the
partner’s face. These attribution errors further distinguish into
attribution errors in reflection symmetry (Thirioux et al., 2009;
i.e., in mirror reversal; Brugger, 2002) and rotation symmetry
(Thirioux et al., 2009; i.e., with preservation of the lateral
asymmetry; Brugger, 2002).
Attribution errors in reflection symmetry (A-Ref errors)
consisted for Self-trials in assessing that the green flash appeared
on the left side of the partner’s face whereas it physically appeared
on the right side of one’s own face, and vice-versa (right–left;
Figure 3A). For Other-trials, it consisted in assessing that the
green flash appeared on the left side of one’s own face whereas
it physically appeared on the right side of the partner’s face, and
vice-versa (right–left; Figure 3B).
We hypothesized that attribution errors in reflection
symmetry for Self-trials (Self→ Other) impairs the egocentered
visuo-spatial mechanisms. These errors would reflect that
participants have identified their partner’s face with their own
face as if their own face were the reflection of the other’s face. That
is, they would have projected their own facial features toward
their partner’s face by mentally translating their own-body in a
linear fashion toward the other’s body. This pattern of errors,
although it does not involve heterocentered perspective change,
requires that participants feel themselves toward the other, i.e.,
do not feel themselves in their actual embodied self-location
and egocentered reference frame. Accordingly, egocentered
visuo-spatial mechanisms would be impaired (Figure 4A).
In contrast, we hypothesized that attribution errors in
reflection symmetry for Other-trials (Other → Self) improve
the egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms. These errors would
reflect that participants have identified their face with their
partner’s face as if the other’s face were the reflection of their own
face. That is, they would have introjected the facial features of
their partner in their own face by mentally translating his/her
body in a linear fashion toward their own-body but without
matching between the bodies’ axes. Accordingly, this pattern of
errors occurring in an embodied self-location and egocentered
visuo-spatial perspective would reinforce these mechanisms
(Figure 4B).
Attribution errors in rotation symmetry (A-Rot errors)
consisted for Self-trials in assessing that the green flash appeared
on the right side of the partner’s face whereas it physically
appeared on the right side of one’s own face, and vice-versa (left–
left; Figure 3A). For Other-trials, it consisted in assessing that the
green flash appeared on the right side of one’s own face whereas
it physically appeared on the right side of the partner’s face, and
vice-versa (left–left; Figure 3B).
We hypothesized that attribution errors in rotation symmetry
for Self-trials improve the heterocentered visuo-spatial
mechanisms. These errors would reflect that participants adopted
the visuo-spatial perspective of their partner (heterocentered
mechanism) and felt themselves as being located in their facing
partner’s body position (disembodied self-location). That is, they
would have incorporated the other’s facial features into their
own face by mentally rotating their own-body by 180◦ into their
partner’s body and aligning their own-body axis on the body axis
of their partner (Figure 4C).
In contrast, we hypothesized that attribution errors in rotation
symmetry for Other-trials impaired the heterocentered coding
because they rely upon egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms
and self-location processes. In fact, these errors would reflect that
participants have incorporated the other’s facial features into the
representation of their own face by mentally rotating the other’s
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FIGURE 3 | Error patterns in the Interpersonal Visual Stimulation phase. (A) Error patterns for Self-trials. Lateralization errors consisted in assessing that the
green flash appeared on the left side of one’s own face whereas it physically appeared on the right side. Attribution errors in reflection and rotation symmetry,
respectively, consisted in assessing that the green flash appeared on the left and right side of the partner’s face whereas it physically appeared on the right side of
one’s own face. And vice-versa for flashes appearing on the left side of one’s own face. (B) Error patterns for Other-trials. Lateralization errors consisted in assessing
that the green flash appeared on the left side of the partner’s face whereas it appears on the right side. Attribution errors in reflection and rotation symmetry,
respectively, consisted in assessing that the green flash appeared on the left and right side of one’s own face whereas it physically appeared on the right side of the
partner’s face. And vice-versa for flashes appearing on the left side of the partner’s face.
body by 180◦ into their own-body and aligning the other’s body
axis on their own body axis (Figure 4D).
Lateralization errors consisted for Self-trials in assessing that
the green flash appeared on the left side of one’s own face whereas
it physically appeared on the right side and vice-versa (right–
left; Figure 3A). For Other-trials it consisted in assessing that
the green flash appeared on the left side of the partner’s face
whereas it appears on the right side, and vice-versa (right–left;
Figure 3B).
To test which errors pattern prevailed during exposure to IVS,
we computed a Kruskal–Wallis test on the number of errors
between error patterns. To further test whether the number
of correct responses and errors for each error pattern differed
between Self- and Other-trials, we calculated Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests. Finally, to test for RTs differences between conditions
(Self- vs. Other-trials), we calculated Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
This was done for the correct responses and each pattern of
errors.
Post-stimulation Test
In this test, we computed the total amount and corresponding
percentage of correct responses, and associated RTs for each
participant in each task, as in the pre-stimulation test. To test
for statistical analyses between the Self- and Other-task, we
calculated Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on performance (number
of correct response) and RTs.
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FIGURE 4 | Patterns of attribution errors with respect to visuo-spatial mechanisms and mental body transformations. (A) Attribution errors in reflection
symmetry for Self-trials indicate that participants have identified their partner’s face with their own face by mentally translating their own-body in a linear fashion
toward the other’s body. (B) Attribution errors in reflection symmetry for Other-trials indicate that participants identified their face with their partner’s face by mentally
translating the other’s body in a linear fashion toward their own-body but without matching between the bodies’ axes. (C) For Self-trials, attribution errors in rotation
symmetry reflect that participants adopted the visuo-spatial perspective of their partner (heterocentered mechanism) and felt themselves as being located in their
facing partner’s body position (disembodied self-location). That is, they incorporated the other’s facial features into their own face by mentally rotating their own-body
by 180◦ into their partner’s body and aligning their own-body axis on the body axis of their partner. (D) Attribution errors in rotation symmetry for Other-trials indicate
that participants have incorporated the other’s facial features into the representation of their own face by mentally rotating the other’s body by 180◦ into their
own-body and aligning the other’s body axis on their own body axis.
Then, to statistically test whether the IVS-phase impacted
the egocentered or heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms, we
computed a 2× 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with permutation
tests on the number of correct response and RTs with time
(pre-IVS vs. post-IVS) and tasks (Self-task vs. Other-task) as the
factors. We calculated the statistical power which was about 0.71
(1 – β).
As mentioned above (see Participants), we excluded the data
from four participants [participants 9 (P9), 10 (P10), 14 (P14),
and 17 (P17)] because of bad recording conditions in the IVS-
phase. During the debriefing (see Phase 3: Post-stimulation test),
P9 and P10 (tested in the same recording session) reported
that they intentionally performed slight lateral head movements
in the IVS-phase. P14 and P17 (tested in different recording
sessions) reported that they performed slight contradictions of
facial muscles. According to these participants, these strategies
helped them to discriminate more easily between their own face
and that of their partner and the self–other merging illusion was
not effective. Corroborating their self-report, the data analysis
indicated that these participants obtained in average 72.5 ± 8%
(mean ± SE) of correct responses in the IVS-phase although the
mean percentage of correct responses was about 27.3± 3% in the
remaining fourteen participants. Consequently, the final analyses
on the pre-stimulation, IVS and post-stimulation tests were only
performed on the data from the remaining fourteen participants
(Table 2).
RESULTS
Pre-stimulation Test (Phase 1)
In the pre-stimulation test, participants performed correctly
for the Self- and Other-tasks, using egocentered visuo-spatial
mechanisms in the Self-task (98.6 ± 0.5%; mean ± SEM)
and heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms in the Other-task
(97.3 ± 0.1%), respectively. Correct performance did not differ
between tasks (p= 0.300).
Concerning response speed, participants performed
significantly faster in the Self- (541 ± 30 ms) than Other-task
(686± 41 ms) (p < 0.001).
Interpersonal Visual Stimulation (Phase 2)
On average, participants performed correctly in 27.3 (±3.4) % of
the trials (pooled data from Self- and Other-trials). There was 26.3
(±3.6) % of no-response and 46.4 (±4.2) % of errors (Figure 5).
There was no statistical difference between Self- and Other-trials
(all p > 0.05).
On the total amount of errors, participants performed more
attribution (96.7 ± 3.8%) than lateralization errors (3.3 ± 0.4%)
(Figure 5). Regarding attribution errors, there were more
errors in reflection (89.8 ± 3.6%) than rotation symmetry
(10.2 ± 1.5%). This was statistically confirmed by a Kruskal–
Wallis test (p < 0.001) and paired comparisons [A-Ref errors
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TABLE 2 | Interpersonal Visual Stimulation phase: correct performance.
Participants Correct Performance %
P1 22.5
P2 40.6
P3 20
P4 23.1
P5 48.1
P6 23.8
P7 36.9
P8 43.1
P11 36.9
P12 23.1
P13 16.3
P15 31.2
P16 16.3
P18 0.6
Table 2 reports the percentage of correct responses during exposure to IVS for the
remaining 14 participants.
vs. A-Rot errors (p < 0.001); A-Ref errors vs. Lat-errors
(p = 0.076)]. This was true for both Self-trials [Kruskal–Wallis,
p < 0.001; paired comparisons, A-Ref errors vs. A-Rot errors
(p = 0.001), A-Ref errors vs. Lat-errors (p < 0.001), A-Rot
errors vs. Lat-errors (p = 0.446)] and Other-trials [Kruskal–
Wallis, p < 0.001; paired comparisons, A-Ref errors vs. A-Rot
errors (p < 0.001), A-Ref errors vs. Lat-errors (p < 0.001), I-Rot
errors vs. Lat-errors (p = 0.819)], when considered separately
(Figure 5). Wilcoxon signed-rank tests further showed that the
number of errors with respect to each error pattern did not
statistically differ between Self- and Other-trials (A-Ref errors,
p = 0.401; A-Rot errors, p = 0.910; Lat-errors, p = 0.511;
Figure 5).
Concerning RTs, there was no statistical difference between
Self- and Other-trials for correct responses (p = 0.650). This was
also true for each pattern of errors (all p > 0.050).
Post-stimulation Test (Phase 3)
In the post-stimulation test, participants performed correctly for
the Self-task (95.6± 1%) and Other-task (95.6± 1.2%). RTs were
faster in the Self- (576 ± 35 ms) than Other-task (680 ± 35 ms)
(p < 0.001).
Statistical comparisons on RTs showed a significant
time × task interaction (p = 0.0444) and a significant effect of
tasks (p < 0.001). There was no effect of time (p = 0.389). These
indicate that RTs significantly increased in the post-stimulation
test (576 ± 35 ms) in comparison to the pre-stimulation test
(541± 30 ms) selectively for the Self-task (Figure 6). Concerning
performance, there was a significant effect of time (p = 0.044)
but no time× task interaction and no effect of task.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we investigated whether identifying oneself
with the face of another individual in the mirror impacts either
the egocentered or heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms
that sustain self–other distinction. For that, self-identification
was manipulated by exposing participants to an IVS condition
in which the reflection of their own face was merged with
that of their facing partner in a semi-transparent double
mirror. In the pre- and post-IVS tests, participants performed
egocentered visuo-spatial transformations with respect to their
own face as reflected in the mirror and heterocentered
visuo-spatial transformations with respect to their partner’s
face seen through the mirror. Our data show that self–
other face identification alters the egocentered visuo-spatial
mechanisms but preserved the heterocentered coding. This
suggests that changes in self-face identification induced a conflict
between the current visual representation and stored mnemonic
representation of the self-face which, in turn, impacted bodily
self-consciousness. We discussed the interaction of bottom-up
and top-down processing factors in self-face identification on
the basis of the nested hierarchy model of the Self (Feinberg,
2000).
Self-face Prioritization Effect in
Egocentered Visuo-spatial Manipulation
Task
In the pre-stimulation test, participants performed correctly
for the egocentered (Self-condition) and heterocentered (Other-
condition) visuo-spatial tasks. Mean percentages of correct
responses did not differ between tasks (Self-task:∼98.6%; Other-
task: ∼97.3%). In contrast, RTs were significantly faster for the
Self-task (∼541 ms) than Other-task (∼686 ms).
Firstly, these faster RTs in the Self-task are possibly explained
by the SFP effect. This prioritized processing of one’s own face
is generated by visual self-recognition processes based upon
view-invariant representations of the face (Tsakiris, 2008) and
by mnemonic representations, attentional processes, retrieval of
semantic and/or autobiographical memories and higher-order
self-evaluation processes (Sui et al., 2015). On a neuro-functional
level, SFP is reflected during self–other face discrimination tasks
in greater activations in a dedicated bilateral fronto-parietal
network, including the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), inferior,
middle and medial frontal cortices, IOG, and temporal gyrus
(Caharel et al., 2002; Uddin et al., 2005a,b; Northoff et al.,
2006; Platek et al., 2006, 2008; Devue and Brédart, 2011; Sui
et al., 2015) as well as in an increased amplitude of the face-
sensitive N170 occipito-temporal component (Keyes et al., 2010).
However, contrasting with studies on SFP, we here did not use
Self- vs. Other-face discrimination tasks in the pre-stimulation
phase. This suggests that this potential SFP effect in our data
was rather due to mere implicit recognition processes, i.e.,
that do not require to explicitly discriminate between Self and
Others.
Secondly, this difference in response speed is also typical for
egocentered vs. heterocentered visuo-spatial tasks and conforms
to previous behavioral studies employing comparable mental
own-body transformation tasks (Parsons, 1987; Zacks et al., 1999;
Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006; Mohr et al., 2006; Easton
et al., 2009; Thirioux et al., 2009, 2010, 2014b). Computing
heterocentered visuo-spatial judgments triggers an increase of
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FIGURE 5 | Percentages of correct performance and errors in the Interpersonal Visual Stimulation phase. Participants in the IVS phase performed
correctly in ∼27% of the trials. There were ∼46% of errors. Attribution errors highly prevailed in comparison to lateralization errors. Percentage of attribution errors in
reflection symmetry, i.e., in mirror like-fashion, was significantly higher than in rotation symmetry, i.e., with preservation of the lateral asymmetry.
RTs in comparison to egocentered visuo-spatial computation. In
fact, the former necessitate to mentally aligning one’s own-body
axis on the other’s body axis (Arzy et al., 2006). This effect is
further greater when the position of the other’s body in space
does not match that of one’s own body, as in face-to-face postural
configurations (Thirioux et al., 2009, 2010, 2014b). Accordingly,
imagining oneself to be located in the body position of a front-
facing individual, as it was requested in the Other-task, requires
a mental rotation by 180◦ of one’s own-body. This specific visuo-
spatial and mental own-body transformation is cognitively more
demanding than computing visuo-spatial judgments centered on
one’s own-body as the latter do not need mental own-body or
egocentered transformation.
Therefore, a combination of visual-mnemonic processing of
the face and visuo-spatial processing of the body may account
for our RTs data. We suggest that both intentional object –
i.e., one’s own face vs. the other’s face – and nature of the
requested cognitive tasks – i.e., visuo-spatial judgments centered
on one’s own vs. other’s body – may explain theses faster RTs
in the Self- than Other-task. This hypothesis is reinforced by
neuroimaging data, showing that face- and body-recognition
triggers co-activations in the right insular and parietal cortices
(Kircher et al., 2001; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Devue et al., 2007;
Tsakiris et al., 2007). These co-activations in brain regions
that underpin multisensory processing, specifically in the right
hemisphere, suggest that face- and body-recognition share
more general self-related processes (Tsakiris, 2008). Therefore,
our findings tend to reflect the phenomenological status of
the self as first and immediate reference frame, speaking in
favor of an implicit self-advantage theory (Ma and Han, 2010;
Ferri et al., 2011; Geng et al., 2012; Tacikowski and Ehrsson,
2016).
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FIGURE 6 | Comparison of reaction times between the pre- and
post-stimulation tests. Statistical comparisons showed that RTs significantly
increased in the post-stimulation test in comparison to the pre-stimulation
test. This was also observed for the Self-task but not for the Other-task.
Spontaneous Mirror-Like Self–Other
Identification during Exposure to
Interpersonal Visual Stimulation
Exposure to the IVS followed the completion of the baseline
visuo-spatial tasks. During IVS, participants saw the reflection of
their own face that was merged with that of their facing partner
in the mirror. They were instructed to assess whether the green
flash on the self–other morphed face as reflected in the mirror
was physically appearing on the left or right side of their own face
or that of their partner. Participants were significantly impaired
in responding to the requested tasks and performed correctly
in about 27% of the trials. The errors rate reached about 46%
and the no-response rate about 26%. Attribution errors highly
prevailed (∼97%), in comparison to lateralization errors (∼3%).
Furthermore, there were significantly more attribution errors in
reflection (∼90%) than rotation symmetry (∼10%), i.e., in mirror
reversal than with preservation of the lateral asymmetry. The
mean amount of attribution errors in both reflection and rotation
symmetry did not statistically differ between Self-trials (i.e., when
the green flash physically appeared on one’s own face) and Other-
trials (i.e., when the green flash physically appeared on the other’s
face).
Firstly, this dominant pattern of attribution errors, compared
to lateralization errors, shows that participants had more
difficulties in correctly recognizing which face (i.e., their own or
that of their partner) was physically targeted by the green flash
than in correctly locating the green flash per se (right vs. left
side of the face). Moreover, the prevailing pattern of attribution
errors in reflection symmetry in particular conforms to our
working hypothesis that self–other identification is associated
with mirror-like behaviors.
Secondly, this high prevalence of mirror-like behaviors is
an interesting finding because this behavioral pattern arised
spontaneously between participants. In fact, self-identification
with the other’s face in previous studies is traditionally elicited
by the use of IMS that is intentionally designed in a mirror-like
fashion (e.g., Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2009). Such design aims
to elicit a specular correspondence between the touch that is
felt by the participant on his/her cheek and the synchronous
“touching” paintbrush that is seen on the other’s cheek. As an
example, the tested participant is feeling a touch on his/her
right cheek while seeing a paintbrush touching synchronously
the left cheek of the other’s face (Sforza et al., 2009). In
our experiment, and although we did not use interpersonal
multisensory – i.e., visuo-tactile – but unisensory – i.e., visual –
stimulation, this mirror-like behavior occurred spontaneously
between participants. That is, although we did not bias self–other
identification face toward this specular modality.
Thirdly, our data show that attribution errors in reflection
symmetry did not differ between Self- and Other-trials. This
suggests that participants have over-attributed their own facial
features to the other’s face (Self→ Other) as well as having over-
attributed the other’s facial features to their own face (Other→
Self). That is, they have projected the features of their face toward
the other’s face as many as having introjected the features of their
partner’s face toward their own face. We here propose that this
absence of difference between projection- and introjection-based
processes indicates a bidirectional self–other face identification.
This bidirectional self- and other-facial features attribution in
a specular correspondence probably generated a balanced self–
other confusion effect. That is, a self–other confusion that was
not determined by a unidirectional over-inclusion of self- or
other-attributes.
Taken together, our data demonstrate that our newly
developed paradigm has many advantages for the investigation
of self-consciousness and self–other distinction. It enables
generating a robust self–other face merging illusory effect in
ecologically more valid conditions, i.e., when two individuals
are physically facing each other and interacting. It significantly
distinguishes, thus, from paradigms as used in previous studies
that are most often based upon pre-recorded static images
or movies of progressive morphing from self- to other-
face and vice-versa (Tsakiris, 2008; Tajadura-Jiménez et al.,
2012; Maister et al., 2013; Apps et al., 2015). Moreover, our
paradigm enables eliciting self–other identification experience
from an interpersonal unisensory (visual) stimulation. Finally
our paradigm provides empirical criteria that are based upon
objective measures (RTs and percentages of performances) of
self–other face identification. That is, measures that are not only
based upon self-rated (subjective) judgments as usually employed
(Sforza et al., 2009; Maister et al., 2013).
Self-face Identification Contributes to
Bodily Self-consciousness
In the post-stimulation test, i.e., after exposure to IVS,
participants performed the same Self-task (egocentered visuo-
spatial mechanisms) and Other-task (heterocentered visuo-
spatial mechanisms) as in the pre-stimulation test. Comparable
to pre-IVS, participants performed significantly faster in the Self-
(∼576 ms) than Other-task (∼680 ms). Interestingly enough,
visual comparison of the pre- and post-IVS data suggested
that RTs increased after IVS but selectively for the Self-task.
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This effect was confirmed by statistical comparisons, showing
a significant time (pre-IVS vs. post-IVS) × task (Self-task vs.
Other-task) interaction that was attributable to a significant
difference between the pre-IVS Self-task and the post-IVS Self-
task. RTs for the Other-task did not differ after exposure to
IVS in comparison to the pre-stimulation phase. Therefore,
our data indicate that participants were slow-downed and
had more difficulties in performing own-body centered and
egocentered visuo-spatial judgments after than before exposure
to the stimulation. This suggests that the self–other identification
during IVS specifically impaired the egocentered visuo-spatial
mechanisms but preserved the heterocentered coding.
It could be objected that the prioritized processing of
the self-face was lost in the post-stimulation phase because
participants performed the task twice. Accordingly, the observed
effect on self-related RTs would not have been caused by the
exposure to IVS but by the repetition of the task, i.e., by
long and more difficult perceptual conditions. This would have
triggered an increase in response time and self-related stimuli
would have been more impacted than other-related stimuli.
This would be also concordant with the significant effect of
time on performance, showing that participants performed
more errors for both Self- and Other-tasks in the post- than
pre-stimulation phase. However, this objection is not tenable.
Firstly, if so, other-related stimuli RTs should have also been
affected by the repetition of the task and prolonged exposure
to the same task. Secondly, because heterocentered visuo-spatial
computation is cognitively more demanding than egocentered
visuo-spatial computation, other-related stimuli should therefore
have more suffered from the repetition of the task than self-
related stimuli. Which was not the case: RTs in the Other-task
did not differ between the pre- (∼686 ms) and post-stimulation
(∼680 ms).
Previous behavioral findings (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2009;
Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Maister et al., 2013) demonstrated
that IMS affected both self-face recognition and representation
whereas the recognition and representation of the other’s face
remained unchanged (Maister et al., 2013). It is worth noting
that our experimental design differs from that of previous studies.
We here investigated the effect of a visual conflict between
one’s own face and the face of another individual on visuo-
spatial mechanisms whilst prior studies investigated the effect of
a visuo-tactile conflict between the other’s face and one’s own
face on self-face recognition. However, despite these differences,
our data showing that egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms
were impaired after exposure to IVS whereas heterocentered
visuo-spatial mechanisms were preserved, converge in a general
way with these prior results. Considered collectively, data show
that a situation of self–other face merging illusion, be it caused
by multisensory (visuo-tactile) [previous work] or unisensory
(visual) stimulation [present work], alters self-related processing
but preserves other-related processing. This is true whether self-
related processing concerns face-recognition [previous work] or
egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms [present work].
It should be acknowledged that the difference on RTs (+35 ms)
between the pre- and post-stimulation tests in our data is
tenuous. However, prior studies, even though using different
behavioral parameters, also reported low differences between
tasks that were performed before and after stimulation. For
instance, studies by Tsakiris (2008) and Tajadura-Jiménez et al.
(2012) have, respectively, shown that images of self–other
morphed face that contained an average 5.6% and 3% more
of facial other-features were assessed as self-face in the post-
stimulation test, compared to the pre-stimulation test. These
tenuous differences in our data and these of other groups,
although statistically significant, may reflect the robustness of
the neural self-representation and solidity of the self as first-
reference frame in normal subjects. On a more general level,
our data indicate that a transitory visual self–other confusion
impairs, although slightly, the mechanisms of egocentered
spatial coding that underpins both self-location and first-person
perspective.
Initially, we hypothesized that a prevailing pattern of
attribution errors in reflection symmetry for Self-trials
vs. Other-trials, respectively, impairs and improves the
egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms. Our data are only
partly in accordance with this working hypothesis. Firstly, as
mentioned earlier, participants identified in a bidirectional
manner their own face with that of their partner and the face
of their partner with their own face. That is, participants have
introjected their partner’s facial features toward their own
face (Other → Self; Self-trials) as many as having projected
their own facial features toward their partner’s face (Self →
Other; Other-trials). Secondly, we observed an increase of
RTs that was selective for the Self-task after exposure to IVS.
Considered collectively, these results suggest that attribution
errors in reflection symmetry for Self-trials impaired the
egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms, verifying our hypothesis.
However, these further suggest that attribution errors in
reflection symmetry for Other-trials not only did not improve
but impaired the egocentered coding, contradicting our
hypothesis.
This indicates that projection- and introjection-based
processes equally altered embodied self-location and egocentered
visuo-spatial mechanisms because they equally disturbed the Self
boundaries in our study. That is, these two processes equally
transformed the margins between the Self and the Other in
either externalizing (Freud, 1930) self-face features into the
other (projection) or alienating (Freud, 1930) facial features
that do not belong to the self but to the other (introjection;
Feinberg and Keenan, 2005). These results are in accordance
with the Freudian view that “the boundaries of the ego are
not constant” (Freud, 1930). Therefore, our results confirm
that body-related information needs to be continually updated
for the maintenance of the sense of the Self in line with
previous studies. But they also show that self-face identification
plays a major role in this continual body-related information
updating. Accordingly, this association between a bidirectional
self–other identification that was based upon projection and
introjection processes in the IVS-phase and impairment of
the egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms in the post-IVS test
indicates that self-face identification importantly contributes
to bodily self-consciousness. To the best of our knowledge, we
raised here a novel phenomenological and functional aspect
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of the relation between self-face identification and bodily self-
consciousness insofar as previous studies have mainly shown,
inversely, how bodily self-consciousness contributes to self-face
identification.
It is well-documented that recognizing one’s own face in
the mirror is an important behavioral marker of higher-
order consciousness (Apps et al., 2015; see also Keenan et al.,
2005). Self-face recognition firstly requires that the current
perception of the seen face’s surface structure that is based
upon visual-attentional processing matches with the kinesthesic
representation of one’s own-body. Secondly, it also necessitates
that this multisensory integration-based representation matches
with a stored representation of one’s own face in the perceptual
memory system (Devue and Brédart, 2011). Higher-order self-
related semantic and autonoetic representations may be then
retrieved, enabling to access an amodal representation of the
self and validating, in turn, the belief that the reflection seen
in the mirror “is me” (Sugiura et al., 2014; see also Sugiura
et al., 2012). We here further suggest that during exposure
to IVS the conflict between the current visual representation
of one’s own face and the stored representation of the self-
face in the perceptual memory system has elicited projection
and introjection-based behavioral responses. These behaviors
have significantly disturbed the Self boundaries as reflected
in alteration of the egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms
in the post-stimulation test. Therefore, it would mean that
changes in the current visual representation of one’s own
face induced a mismatching with the stored mnemonic
representation of the self-face which, in turn, impacted bodily
self-consciousness.
According to the nested hierarchy model of the Self (Feinberg,
2000, 2001, 2011; Feinberg and Keenan, 2005), lower-order
features are “nested within” higher-order features, i.e., are
bound together and dependent from each other with respect to
bottom-up and top-down dynamic processing. This enables the
emergence of the Self as a more complex whole (Feinberg and
Keenan, 2005). According to this model, self-face identification
would be based upon an interaction between bottom-up flow
of information, from perceptual to higher-order cognitive
processes, but also top-down processing. Our data may be in line
with this dynamic model in suggesting that self-face mnemonic
representation, from the processing of a conflicting bottom-up
flow of information, may have top-down impacted lower-order
bodily self-consciousness.
To sum up it all, the present study shows for the first time
the impact of self-face identification on the egocentered visuo-
spatial mechanisms. It further indicates that the mnemonic
self-representation importantly contributes to bodily self-
consciousness. On a neuro-functional level, we hypothesize
that changes in the IOG activity during the IVS phase
triggered a modulation of the activation in the right frontal
areas (notably inferior frontal gyrus and medial frontal
cortex) that, in turn, top-down modulated the right TPJ
activity (supporting egocentered and first-person perspective).
Moreover, we hypothesize that this activation modulation in
the frontal cortex preserved the left TPJ activity (supporting
heterocentered and second-person perspective). It would be
of great interest to test these neuro-functional hypotheses in
future experiments, using the same paradigm and during EEG
hyperscanning recording. Extending previous findings (Tsakiris,
2008; Sforza et al., 2009; Apps et al., 2012, 2015; Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., 2012; Maister et al., 2013; Preston et al.,
2015), our present results suggests that not only bodily self-
consciousness contributes to self-face identification but that
self-face identification also plays a major role in bodily self-
consciousness.
Concerning bodily self-consciousness, our data also highlight
the importance of the egocentered visuo-spatial processing
in the distinction between self and others. This is further
concordant with the phenomenological hypothesis that bodily
self-consciousness, under non-pathological conditions, lies at
the basis of a balanced self–other relationship (Langdon and
Coltheart, 2001; Thirioux, 2011). This also corroborates the
view that bodily self-consciousness dysfunctions, i.e., a poor
somaesthetic insight (Jaafari and Markova, 2011), contribute
to generate disorders of social relationships (Langdon et al.,
2001) and empathic process in psychiatric diseases such as
schizophrenia (Thirioux and Jaafari, 2015). Such disturbances
in empathic and self–other distinction processes are reflected
in either difficulty in disengaging from oneself as first-
reference frame or in over-exaggerated facility in inhibiting one’s
egocentered perspective in patients with, respectively, prevailing
negative and positive symptoms (Thirioux et al., 2014b).
CONCLUSION
In the present study, we report that self-identification with
the face of another individual alters the egocentered visuo-
spatial mechanisms but preserves the heterocentered coding.
In accordance with an implicit self-advantage theory, our
findings suggest that self-identification contributes to bodily
self-consciousness. These further reinforce new theoretical
views and experimental data according to which self-face
identification and bodily self-consciousness share perceptual-
cognitive and neurobiological units. Our data seem to confirm
the originality as well as solidity of our newly developed
experimental paradigm. Moreover, our paradigm may be used
to investigate disorders of self-consciousness, sense of identity
and self–other distinction in psychiatric and neurological diseases
and also in remediation protocols that aim to improve such
deficits.
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